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Abstract: In this paper, I discuss the actual conditions and the determinants of  
co-residence between older parents and their children in China, especially the impact of 
bequest motives on parent-child co-residence, using micro data from the “Survey of 
Living Preferences and Satisfaction,” conducted at Osaka University.  More 
specifically, I use three subsamples of older respondents (those who live in urban areas, 
those who live in rural areas, and the pooled sample of both) to analyze the impact of 
bequest motives and other factors on the probability of parent-child co-residence.    The 
results are as follows: Bequest motives are strong in China, with more than 60 percent 
of respondents having a bequest motive, and the parent-child co-residence rate is also 
high (just under 60 percent).    Bequest motives do not have a significant impact on the 
probability of parent-child co-residence in any of the three samples.  However, in 
urban areas of China, if older parents own their own homes, the probability that they 
co-reside with their children increases as the value of their home increases.  In rural 
areas of China and in the country as a whole, the coefficient of parental income is 
positive and significant in some cases, meaning that children are more likely to live with 
their parents if parental income is higher.  All of these results suggest that, in both 
urban and rural areas of China, the Chinese are selfishly motivated and the life-cycle 
model applies. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Are the Chinese selfish or altruistic?      In this paper, I discuss the actual conditions and 
the determinants of co-residence between older parents and their children in China, 
especially the impact of bequest motives on the probability of parent-child co-residence, 
using micro data from the 2006 “Survey of Living Preferences and Satisfaction” (urban 
households) and the 2007 “Survey of Living Preferences and Satisfaction” (rural 
households), which were conducted in Feb. 2006 and Mar. 2007, respectively, as part of 
the 21st Century Center of Excellence (COE) Program of the Graduate School of 
Economics and the Institute of Social and Economic Research of Osaka University.    In 
so doing, I try to shed light on which theoretical model (the selfish life-cycle model or 
the altruism model) applies in China. 
  
The issue of which model of household behavior applies in the real world is an 
important one, and it also has important policy implications.    For example, the altruism 
model implies that if parents leave a bequest to their children regardless of whether their 
children provide anything in return, there is a danger that wealth inequalities will be 
passed on, and increase, from generation to generation.  By contrast, if the selfish 
life-cycle model is valid, there is a danger that parents who do not have any 
bequeathable wealth or who have bequeathable wealth but do not want to leave it to 
their children will not be able to live with their children and receive care from them. 
 
As far as I know, there have not been any previous studies of parent-child co-residence 
in China, but there have been a number of such studies in Japan and the United States.  
For example, Ohtake and Horioka (1994) analyze the determinants of the probability of  
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parent-child co-residence of older parents and find that the probability that they 
co-reside with their children increases as the value of their home increases, which 
implies that the Japanese are selfishly motivated.  By contrast, Iwamoto and Fukui 
(2001) find that older parents are less likely to live with their children if parental income 
is higher.  At first sight, this finding appears to be contrary to the selfish life-cycle 
model, but if living separately (privacy) is a normal good, parents would presumably 
want to live separately from their children as long as they can afford to do so.    Yamada 
(2006) conducts a careful analysis of the determinants of intergenerational co-residence, 
distance between residences, and frequency of contact between children and parents and 
finds strong support for the selfish exchange motive but none for the demonstration 
effect or mutual altruism.  Wakabayashi and Horioka (2008) analyze the determinants 
of the co-residence behavior of elderly parents and their children and find that the 
life-cycle model, the dynasty model, social norms and traditions and the altruism model, 
especially the first three, are all applicable to some extent in Japan.  Kureishi and 
Wakabayashi (2009) are the first to conduct a simultaneous analysis of co-residence 
with one’s own parents and with one’s parents-in-law and find that the two decisions are 
interrelated and that the Japanese are selfishly motivated.  Thus, virtually all of the 
studies for Japan find that parent-child co-residence is selfishly motivated and 
consistent with the life-cycle model.  Finally, Dekle (1990) does not look at 
parent-child co-residence explicitly but finds that the wealth holdings of the elderly do 
not depend on the number of children, which suggests the absence of an altruistic 
bequest motive and is consistent with the findings of the other studies.     
 
Horioka, et al. (1998), Horioka, et al. (2000) and Horioka (2008) present data on the  
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impact of bequest motives on the probability of parent-child co-residence and find that 
parents who have a bequest motive have a much higher probability of co-residing with 
their children in Japan but that there is no clear relationship between the two in the U.S.   
These results suggest that the life-cycle model is applicable in Japan and that the 
Japanese are selfish but that the altruism model is applicable in the U.S and that 
Americans  are  altruistic.       
 
Thus, there have been a number of studies of parent-child co-residence behavior in 
Japan and the U.S., but as far as I know, this paper is the first one to analyze the 
determinants of the probability of parent-child co-residence in China, and in this sense, 
this paper makes an original and important contribution. 
 
To summarize my findings, I use three subsamples of older respondents (defined as  
those who are aged 50 or old)--those who live in urban areas, those who live in rural 
areas and the pooled sample of both--to analyze the impact of bequest motives and other 
factors on the probability of parent-child co-residence.  The results are as follows: 
Bequest motives are strong in China, with more than 60 percent of respondents having a 
bequest motive, and the parent-child co-residence rate is also high (just under 60 
percent).  Bequest motives do not have a significant impact on the probability of 
parent-child co-residence in any of the three samples.  However, in urban areas of 
China, if older parents own their own homes, the probability that they co-reside with 
their children increases as the value of their home increases.  In rural areas of China 
and in the country as a whole, the coefficient of parental income is positive and 
significant in some cases, meaning that children are more likely to live with their  
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parents if parental income is higher.    All of these results suggest that in both urban and 
rural areas of China, the Chinese are selfishly motivated and the life-cycle model 
applies. 
 
This paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, I discuss two theoretical models of 
household behavior with emphasis on their implications for parent-child co-residence 
and bequest motives; in Section 3, I describe the data sources used in my analysis; in 
Section 4, I explain the variable definitions: in Section 5, I describe the estimation 
model; in Section 6, I present descriptive statistics on the variables used in the analysis 
with emphasis on parent-child co-residence and bequest motives; in Section 7, I present 
my estimation results; and in Section 8, I summarize my findings and discuss the policy 
implications of my findings. 
 
2.  Theoretical Models of Household Behavior and Their Implications for 
Parent-Child Co-residence and Bequest Motives 
 
In this section, I briefly describe two theoretical models of household behavior and the 
implications of these models for parent-child co-residence and bequest motives. 
 
(1) The life-cycle model: This model assumes that parents are selfish and do not care 
about their children.  Thus, if this model is valid, parents will not leave any 
bequests at all to their children or will leave bequests only when their children 
provide something in return such as co-residence, care, and/or financial support 
during old age.    Children are also selfish and do not care about their parents in this  
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model.    Thus, if this model is valid, children will live with their parents or care for 
them only if their parents provide something in return such as bequests.  Thus, 
parents-child co-residence can be explained by this model, and it predicts a positive 
relationship between parent-child co-residence and bequest motives. 
 
(2) The altruism model: This model assumes that parents harbor intergenerational 
altruism toward their children.  Thus, if this model is valid, parents will leave a 
bequest to their children regardless of whether or not their children provide 
something in return.    If children also harbor intergenerational altruism toward their 
parents, they will live with their parents and/or care for them even if they do not 
receive anything in return from their parents.  Therefore, this model can explain 
parent-child co-residence and predicts that there will not necessarily be any 
relationship between parent-child co-residence and bequest motives. 
   
3.  Data Sources 
 
In this section, I describe the three data sources used in this analysis. 
 
(1) “Survey of Living Preferences and Satisfaction” (urban households) 
The “Survey of Living Preferences and Satisfaction” (urban households) (hereafter 
referred to as the ”Urban Survey”) was conducted in February 2006 as part of the 
21st Century Center of Excellence (COE) Program of the Graduate School of 
Economics and the Institute of Social and Economic Research of Osaka University.   
1500 respondents aged 20 to 69 living in six major cities (Shanghai, Beijing,  
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Chengdu, Guangzhou, Shenyang, and Wuhan) of China were selected at random and 
interviewed face-to-face. 
 
(2) “Survey of Living Preferences and Satisfaction” (rural households) 
    The “Survey of Living Preferences and Satisfaction” (rural areas) (hereafter referred 
to as the “Rural Survey”) was conducted in March 2007 and used a questionnaire 
similar to the “Urban Survey.”  500 respondents aged 20 to 69 living in six rural 
areas (Ezhou, Shiyan and Suizhou of Hubei province and Hurudao, Panjin and 
Yinkou of Liaoning province) of China were selected at random and interviewed 
face-to-face. 
 
Both of these two surveys collect a variety of detailed information on respondents 
and their family members--for example, on their age, sex, marital status, occupation, 
educational attainment, number of children, living arrangements, income, and bequest 
motives.    Thus, they are well-suited for conducting the analysis in this paper. 
 
I used the sample of widowed males and married couples with children for which the 
male household head is 50 years old or older and for whom all of the necessary 
information is available.   
 
(3) “Main Indicators of Real Estate in 35 Large and Medium-sized Cities” (2005) 
Data on the sales price of condominiums per square meter by city in China were 
taken from this data source.  These data are included in Chapter 6 of the 2006 





4.  Variable Definitions   
 
In this section, I define the dependent and explanatory variables used in my analysis. 
 
The dependent variable I use is as follows:   
  
CORES (a dummy variable for parent-child co-residence) 
 
The Urban Survey collects detailed information on the composition of respondents’ 
families.    Respondents were asked which of the following choices corresponds to their 
own family composition:   
 
1.  Live alone 
2.  Couple only 
3.  Couple and children 
4.  Parents and couple 
5.  Couple, children, and parents 
6.  Couple, children, parents, and siblings of the couple 
7.  Other 




In the Rural Survey, the same question was asked and the choices were the same except 
that choice 8 was not included. 
 
CORES is a dummy variable that equals one if respondents live with adult children and 
zero otherwise.  More specifically, if respondents chose options 3, 4, 5 or 6 and their 
children are aged 18 or older, CORES was given a value of one, but if respondents 
chose options 3, 4, 5 or 6 and their children are aged 17 or younger, or if they chose 
options 1 or 2, CORES was given a value of zero.  Respondents who chose options 7 
or 8 were dropped from the sample.  In the Rural Survey, there is an additional option 
(“parents only”), which is presumably a subset of option 7, and respondents who chose 
this option were given a value of zero. 
 
The explanatory variables I used are as follows: 
 
BEQUEST (bequest motive dummy) 
In both the Urban and Rural Surveys, respondents were asked whether or not they want 
to leave as large a bequest as possible to their children, etc.    The options given were as 
follows: 
 
1.    I think so   
2.    I tend to think so  
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3.    I cannot say one way or the other 
4.    I tend not to think so 
5.    I do not think so   
 
BEQUEST is a dummy variable that equals one if parents think (or tend to think) that 
parents should leave as large a bequest as possible to their children, etc. and zero 
otherwise. 
 
INCOME (parental income) 
INCOME is the monthly income of the respondent and his or her spouse.    INCOME is 
in units of 10,000 yuan. 
 
WORK (a dummy variable for the employment status of the male household head) 
In both the Urban and Rural surveys, respondents were asked which of the following 
choices corresponds to their occupation and their spouse’s occupation: 
 
1. Clerical worker (general, business-related, etc.) 
2. Sales worker (retail shop owner, sales clerk, sales representative, etc.) 
3. Managerial worker (government or company worker with the rank of section chief or 
higher, member of the board of directors, etc.)   
4. Professional or technical worker (teacher, doctor, engineer, writer, etc.)  
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5. Service worker (hairdresser, waiter, waitress, taxi driver, security guard, etc.) 
6. Blue-collar worker (carpenter, repairperson, factory worker, etc.) 
7. Agriculture, forestry, and fisheries 
8. Housewife or househusband (part-time worker) 
9. Housewife or househusband (unemployed) 
10. Student 
11. Retired (excluding housewife and househusband) 
12. Unemployed (excluding for housewife and househusband) 
13. Other   
 
WORK is a dummy variable that equals one if the respondent chose options 1 to 7 and 
zero if the respondent chose options 8 to 12.    Respondents who chose options 13 were 
dropped from the sample.   
 
W (cross-product of INCOME and WORK) 
W was calculated as INCOME * WORK. 
 
HOME (homeownership dummy) 
In both the Urban and Rural Surveys, respondents were asked if they own their own 
homes.  HOME is a dummy variable that equals one if respondents own their own 
homes and zero otherwise.  However, this variable was not included when the rural  
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sample was used because almost all respondents living in rural areas own their own 
homes. 
 
RR (housing price index) 
RR is a housing price index calculated as the sales price of condominiums per square 
meter in each city divided by the average income of households with a male household 
head aged 50 years old or older in that city.  However, this variable was not included 
when the rural sample or the full sample were used because data on the sale price of 
condominiums per square meter are not available in the case of rural areas. 
 
H (cross-product of RR and HOME) 
H was calculated as RR * HOME. 
 
HAGE (the age of the male household head) 
HAGE is the age of the male household head. 
 
HEDU (dummy for the male household head’s educational attainment) 
HEDU is a dummy variable that equals one if the final educational attainment of the 





MARRY (dummy for the male household head’s marital status) 
MARRY is a dummy variable that equals one if respondents chose option 2 (married 
and living with spouse) and zero otherwise. 
 
RURAL (rural dummy) 
RURAL is a dummy variable that equals one if the respondent is a rural household and 
zero otherwise (if the respondent is an urban household).    This variable was included 
only when the full sample was used. 
 
5.  Estimation Model   
 
In this section, I describe the estimation model used in my analysis.  I use the 
following probit model: 
 
Prob (CORES=1)  = a  ＋ b(BEQUEST) ＋  c(INCOME) + dH + eX   
(X: other explanatory variables) 
 
Regarding BEQUEST, if children are selfish, they would be expected to live with their 
older parents only if their parents provide something in return such as bequests.    Thus, 
the coefficient of BEQUEST should be positive.    By contrast, if children are altruistic, 
parent-child co-residence should not depend on the bequest motives of parents and thus 




Regarding parental income (INCOME), if children are selfish, parental income should 
have a positive effect on parent-child co-residence and the coefficient of INCOME 
should be positive.    By contrast, if children are altruistic, parental income should have 
no effect on parent-child co-residence and thus the coefficient of INCOME should be 
zero.  I also tried introducing the cross-product of INCOME (parental income) and 
WORK (a dummy for the employment status of the male household head), because I 
wanted to control for the fact that parental income will be a smaller fraction of lifetime 
income in the case of retired heads than in the case of working heads. 
 
Regarding the parents’ home, if children are selfish and older parents own their own 
homes, the probability that older parents co-reside with their children should increase as 
the value of their home increases.    Thus, the coefficient of the cross-product of HOME 
and RR should be positive.    By contrast, if children are altruistic, the coefficient of the 
cross-product of HOME and RR should have no effect on the probability that they 
co-reside with their children and thus the coefficient of the cross-product of HOME and 
RR should be zero.    I used the cross-product of HOME and RR because housing prices 
should affect the probability of parent-child co-residence only in the case of 
homeowners, but I also included HOME by itself as an additional explanatory variable 
because it might have an effect independent of housing prices. . 
 
Because the probability that older parents co-reside with their children should increase 
with parental income primarily if they have a bequest motive, I tried including the 
cross-product of BEQUEST and INCOME as an additional explanatory variable, but 
because the coefficient of this cross-product term was not at all significant, I dropped it  
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from the final specification. 
 
Besides the probit model I just described, I also estimated a bivariate probit model to 
test whether the co-residence behavior of older parents and their children and bequest 
motives of older parents are determined simultaneously.    I found that I could not reject 
the null hypothesis that the correlation between the error terms of the two equations is 
zero, and moreover, the coefficients of the explanatory variables in the bequest motive 
equation were not significant and the coefficient of the explanatory variables in the 
co-residence equation were almost the same as before.  Thus, I present only the 
estimation results of the probit model . 
 
6.  Descriptive Statistics 
 
In this section, I present descriptive statistics on the variables used in the analysis with 
emphasis on parent-child co-residence and bequest motives. 
 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for all variables used in the analysis, and as can be 
seen from this table, the average co-residence rate is about 59 percent in urban areas,  
rural areas, and the country as a whole.  Thus, there is a strong tendency of older 
parents to live with their children in China, and this tendency is equally strong in urban 
and rural areas. 
 
Table 2 presents data on bequest motives, and if those who think (or tend to think) that 
parents should leave as large a bequest as possible to their children, etc., are regarded as  
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having a bequest motive, the proportion of the older with a bequest motive is 62.4 
percent in urban areas, 69.7 percent in rural areas, and 64.1 percent in the country as a 
whole.  Thus, it seems that the Chinese have a strong bequest motive and that bequest 
motives are somewhat stronger in rural areas than in urban areas. 
 
Table 3 shows parent-child co-residence rates by bequest motive, and as can be seen 
from this table, there is some evidence of a positive correlation between the two.    In all 
three subsamples (urban households, rural households, and all households), the  
parent-child co-residence rate of respondents who have the second strongest bequest 
motive (option 2) is second highest and that of respondents who have the weakest 
bequest motive (option 1) is by far the lowest, but there is no clear pattern in the case of 
the other options..  Thus, this table provides weak evidence in favor of the life-cycle 
model, but a definitive verdict must await the results of the more formal test presented 
in the next section. 
  
Lastly, I present data on parent-child co-residence and bequest motives from an 
international comparative perspective (see Table 4).  As can be seen from Table 4, the 
proportion of older respondents who have a strong bequest motive is lowest (only about 
18 percent) in Japan, intermediate (about 44 percent) in the U.S. and highest (about 66 
percent) in China.    By contrast, the parent-child co-residence rate of older respondents 
is extremely low in the U.S. (only about 10 percent), intermediate (about 50 percent) in 
Japan, and highest (about 59 percent) in China.  In other words, in Japan, bequest 
motives are relatively weak and the parent-child co-residence rate of older individuals is  
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relatively high, in the U.S., bequest motives are relatively strong and the parent-child 
co-residence rate of older individuals is extremely low, while in China, both bequest 
motives and the parent-child co-residence rate of older individuals are high. 
 
7.  Estimation Results concerning the Determinants of Parent-Child Co-residence 
 
In this section, I present the estimation results of my probit analysis of the determinants 
of parent-child co-residence.  Tables 5-7 show the estimation results for urban 
households, rural households and all households, respectively.   
 
As can be seen from Table 5, in the case of urban households, the coefficient of the 
bequest motive dummy is insignificant in all cases but the coefficient of the 
cross-product of the housing price index and the homeownership dummy is positive and 
significant.  Thus, if older parents own their own homes, the probability that they 
co-reside with their children increases as the value of their home increases, implying 
that their children are selfishly motivated and that the life-cycle model applies.        The 
coefficient of the homeownership dummy entered in isolation is negative and significant, 
which means that the co-residence rate of renter households is higher than that of 
homeowner households whose homes have no value, which is not surprising.  I also 
tried including the housing price index alone as an additional explanatory variable.  
When I did so, its coefficient was positive and significant, but the results are not 
presented in the table because the theoretical justification for doing so is weak. 
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As can be seen from Table 6, in the case of rural households, the coefficient of the 
bequest motive dummy is insignificant, as in the case of urban households. However, 
the coefficient of parental income is positive and significant in one of the four cases, 
meaning that children are more likely to live with their parents if parental income is 
higher.    This result suggests that children are selfishly motivated and that the life-cycle 
model applies.  The coefficient of the dummy variable for the employment status of 
the male household head is positive and significant, which implies that children are 
more likely to live with their parents if the head is working.   
 
As can be seen from Table 7, in the case of all households, the coefficient of the bequest 
motive dummy is again insignificant, as in the case of urban and rural households.  
The coefficient of parental income and the dummy variable for the employment status 
of the male household head are positive and significant in two out of four  cases.  These 
results are consistent with the results for rural households, and the former result implies 
that children are selfishly motivated and that the life-cycle model applies. 
  
Moreover, the coefficient of the male household head’s age is negative and significant in 
all three subsamples.    This result suggests that children become less likely to live with 
their parents as their parents age.    The reason for this is a topic for further research.     
 
Thus, I found evidence of selfish behavior in all three subsamples, which suggests that 
the life-cycle model applies in urban as well as rural areas of China. 
 




In this paper, I discuss the actual conditions and the determinants of co-residence 
between older parents and their children in China, especially the impact of bequest 
motives on the probability of parent-child co-residence, using micro data from the 
“Survey of Living Preferences and Satisfaction,” which was conducted as part of the 
21st Century Center of Excellence (COE) Program of the Graduate School of 
Economics and the Institute of Social and Economic Research of Osaka University.  
More specifically, I use three subsamples of older respondents (defined as those who are 
aged 50 or old)--those who live in urban areas, those who live in rural areas, and the 
pooled sample of both--to analyze the impact of bequest motives and other factors on 
the probability of parent-child co-residence.  The results are as follows: Bequest 
motives are strong in China, with more than 60 percent of respondents having a bequest 
motive, and the parent-child co-residence rate is also high (just under 60 percent).  
Bequest motives do not have a significant impact on the probability of parent-child 
co-residence in any of the three samples.  However, in urban areas of China, if older 
parents own their own homes, the probability that they co-reside with their children 
increases as the value of their home increases.  In rural areas of China and in the 
country as a whole, the coefficient of parental income is positive and significant in some 
cases, meaning that children are more likely to live with their parents if parental income 
is higher.  All of these results suggest that, in both urban and rural areas of China, the 
Chinese are selfishly motivated and the life-cycle model applies, as in Japan and unlike 
in the U.S.   
 
Turning finally to the policy implications of my findings, my finding that the value of  
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parents’ homes has a positive impact on the parent-child coresidence rate of homeowner 
households in urban areas and my finding that parental income has a positive impact on 
the parent-child co-residence rate of rural households and of all households implies that 
children are not likely to co-reside with, or care for, their older parents if their parents 
have little or no housing assets and little or no income.    Thus, in turn, implies that it is 
desirable to introduce a public long-term care insurance program and/or to expand the 
public pension system so that elderly individuals with little or no assets and income can 
receive adequate care and financial support.   
 
One other policy implication of my findings is that since parent-child co-residence is 
selfishly motivated and a quid pro quo for bequests from parents to children, net 
intergenerational transfers from parents to children (net of the market value of care and 
co-residence provided by children to their parents) are not necessarily large or even 
positive, meaning that there is little need to worry about wealth inequities being passed 
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Sample Variable Mean Standard Minimum Maximum
deviation
Urban households
CORES 0.591 0.492 0 1
BEQUEST 0.624 0.485 0 1
INCOME 0.213 0.125 0 0.7
MARRY 0.957 0.202 0 1
HOME 0.669 0.471 0 1
DEDU 0.087 0.287 0 1
AGEH 58.028 6.229 50 82
RR 2.201 0.271 1.75 2.593
HOME*RR 1.454 1.046 0 2.593
WORK 0.341 0.475 0 1
WORK*INCOME 0.089 0.149 0 0.7
Rural households
CORES 0.587 0.494 0 1
BEQUEST 0.697 0.461 0 1
INCOME 0.071 0.043 0.013 0.208
MARRY 0.974 0.159 0 1
AGEH 57.303 5.573 50 75
WORK 0.942 0.235 0 1
WORK*INCOME 0.066 0.045 0 0.208
All households
CORES 0.590 0.492 0 1
BEQUEST 0.641 0.480 0 1
INCOME 0.179 0.127 0 0.7
MARRY 0.961 0.193 0 1
HOME 0.743 0.437 0 1
DEDU 0.070 0.255 0 1
AGEH 57.855 6.082 50 82
RURAL 0.240 0.427 0 1
WORK 0.485 0.500 0 1
WORK*INCOME 0.083 0.132 0 0.7
Note: INCOME is in units of 10,000 yuan.
　　　　           http://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/coe/.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variable and Explanatory Variables
Data Source:　The data were taken from the China surveys of the “Survey of Living
                      Preferences and Satisfaction,” which was conducted as part of the 21st Century 




I want to leave as large a bequest as
possible to my children,etc.
    I think so 17.48 (86) 18.71 (29) 17.77 (115)
    I tend to think so 44.92 (221) 50.97 (79) 46.37 (300)
    I can't say one way or the 27.03 (133) 20.00 (31) 25.35 (164)
    other
    I tend not to think so 9.15 (45) 8.39 (13) 8.96 (58)
    I do not think so  1.42 (7) 1.94 (3) 1.55 (10)
Total 100.00 (492) 100.00 (155) 100.00 (647)
Note: The left-hand figures indicate the proportion of respondents, and the right-hand 
          figures in parentheses indicate the number of observations.   
　　　　           http://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/coe/.
Data Source:　The data were taken from the China surveys of the “Survey of Living Preferences
                      and Satisfaction,” which was conducted as part of the 21st Century Center of
                      Excellence (COE) Program of Osaka University.  
Urban households Rural households All households








I want to leave as large a bequest as possible to my children, etc
Urban households
①    I think so 56.98 86
②    I tend to think so 60.18 221
③    I can't say one way or the 60.90 133
      other
④    I tend not to think so 57.78 45
⑤    I do not think so 28.57 7
Total 59.10 492
Rural households
①    I think so 44.83 29
②    I tend to think so 60.76 79
③    I can't say one way or the 61.29 31
      other
④    I tend not to think so 53.85 13
⑤    I do not think so 33.33 3
Total 58.70 155
All households
①    I think so 56.52 115
②    I tend to think so 60.33 300
③    I can't say one way or the 60.96 164
      other
④    I tend not to think so 56.90 58
⑤    I do not think so 30.00 10
Total 59.00 647
                      of Living Preferences and Satisfaction,” which was conducted  
                      as part of the 21st Century Center of Excellence (COE) 
                      Program of Osaka University
　　　　           http://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/coe/.
Table 3:　The Parent-Child Co-residence Rate by Bequest Motive




       Japan U.S. China
The proportion of respondents with a
bequest motive (all ages）
18.09 44.71 65.96
The parent-child co-residence rate of
older parents
49.70 10.05 59.00
          are aged 60 or older, while that for China pertain to respondents who are aged 50 or older.
                      Preferences and Satisfaction,” which was conducted as part of the 21st Century
                      Center of Excellence (COE) Program of Osaka University.  
　　　　          http://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/coe/.
　　　　          The data for Japan and the U.S. were taken from Horioka, et al. (2000).
Table 4:　International Comparison of Bequest Motives and Parent-Child Co-residence
Note: The parent-child co-residence rate for Japan and the U.S. pertain to respondents who






Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
BEQUEST 0.006 -0.001 0.004 -0.003
(0.14) (0.01) (0.10) (0.07)
INCOME 0.295 0.305 0.113 0.093
(1.52) (1.52) (0.44) (0.35)
WORK 0.124 0.066 0.036 -0.040
(2.53)** (1.17) (0.36) (0.38)
W 0.404 0.476
(1.04) (1.21)
HOME -0.484 -0.480 -0.493 -0.492
(2.40)** (2.37)** (2.46)** (2.44)**
H 0.246 0.243 0.252 0.250





MARRY 0.161 0.159 0.170 0.169
(1.42) (1.41) (1.49) (1.49)
Number of
observations
492 492 492 492
Note: The figures in the first row show marginal effects, and the figures in parentheses in the 
          second row show the absolute values of the z statistics.
* significant at the 10 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level; *** significant at the 1 
   percent level.






M o d e l  1M o d e l  2M o d e l  3M o d e l  4
BEQUEST -0.060 -0.047 -0.003 -0.044
(0.07) (0.51) (0.03) (0.48)
INCOME 1.766 1.093 -3.379 -1.819
（1.82）* (1.08) (0.44) (0.24)
WORK 0.525 0.501 0.193 0.330





MARRY 0.082 0.096 0.081 0.094
(0.33) (0.38) (0.32) (0.37)
Number of
observations
155 155 155 155
Note: The figures in the first row show marginal effects, and the figures in parentheses in the 
          second row show the absolute values of the z statistics.
* significant at the 10 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level; *** significant at the 1 
   percent level.






Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
BEQUEST 0.006 -0.004 0.005 -0.004
(0.14) (0.10) (0.13) (0.10)
INCOME 0.325 0.333 0.231 0.231
(1.71)* (1.68)* (0.89) (0.88)
WORK 0.158 0.092 0.118 0.048
(3.33)*** (1.75)* (1.32) (0.53)
W 0.194 0.213
(0.54) (0.58)
HOME -0.034 -0.035 -0.035 -0.037





MARRY 0.153 0.15 0.156 0.153
(1.48) (1.47) (1.51) (1.50)
RURAL -0.049 -0.020 -0.033 -0.003
(0.76) (0.30) (0.47) (0.05)
Number of
observations
647 647 647 647
Note: The figures in the first row show marginal effects, and the figures in parentheses in the 
          second row show the absolute values of the z statistics.
* significant at the 10 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level; *** significant at the 1 
   percent level.
Table 7:　Determinants of Parent-Child Co-Residence of All Households
 